

An Analysis of the Current Australia-China Relationship: Interpretation and Outlook

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Abstract: In recent years, Australia-China relations have undergone significant fluctuations, marked by complex interactions across political, economic, and social spheres. The bilateral relationship faces persistent challenges rooted in ideological divergence, geopolitical competition, and conflicting strategic interests. This paper applies three international relations theories—defensive realism, constructivism, and liberal institutionalism—to analyze the dynamics of this evolving relationship. Defensive realism accounts for the security-driven alignment between Australia and the United States, particularly in military strategy. Constructivism highlights the impact of ideological discord in shaping diplomatic tensions, while liberal institutionalism underscores the resilience of economic cooperation despite political disagreements. The study also investigates Australia's policy transition from strategic hedging to a more balanced stance on China, shaped by domestic political considerations and external pressures. Looking forward, this paper argues that fostering dialogue, deepening economic interdependence, and enhancing cultural exchange are critical to stabilizing bilateral ties. A pragmatic, multifaceted engagement strategy may enable Australia and China to navigate their competitive coexistence toward a more stable and predictable future.

1. Introduction

In recent years, China Australia relations have gone through many twists and turns, exhibiting complex interactive patterns at the political, economic, and social levels. Both countries are important trading partner, but at the same time, due to ideological, geopolitical, and strategic interests factors, the relationship between the two sides also faces many challenges. In particular, since the COVID-19, the Australian government's adjustment in foreign policy and China's policy towards Australia have further complicated bilateral relations. In this context, this article combines theoretical frameworks such as Defensive Realism, Constructivism, Complex Interdependence Theory, and Liberal Institutionalism to explore conflicts and economic dependence in China Australia relations, analyze the main factors behind them, and explore the possible direction of future bilateral relations.

2. From hedging to balance

The turbulent international situation and China's expanding influence in regions such as the

South Pacific have caused Australia to lose its privileges and view China as a challenger that needs to be suppressed according to the "rules based order". This concern about its own status has prompted Australia to actively respond to the US policy towards China.

In the past two decades, Canberra has been quite successful in hedging its economic and security bets between its most important economic partner China and its core security ally the United States. Australian decision-makers have announced that Australia does not have to choose between the two major powers and has a way to strengthen its friendship and cooperation with China while maintaining a close alliance with the United States [12]. The changes in US policies have had a profound impact on this, and compared to previous and Australia's current multilateral balancing policies, the Trump administration tends to adopt a unilateral approach to compete with the rising China, such as through trade tariffs and technology embargoes. In fact, the Trump administration has simultaneously undermined the relationship between the United States and its traditional allies, forcing them to bear greater security obligations and costs. Under such pressure, Australia has abandoned its traditional hedging strategy.

Hedging refers to the act of a country diversifying its economic and security risks. It combines cooperation and competition, contact and containment, which helps to avoid favoring one side and clearly harming the other. Previously, Australia's policy between China and the United States was a clear hedging policy, relying on the United States for defense while also relying on trade with China for the economy. Although decentralization in the international environment may encourage second rate countries to adopt hedging strategies, following is considered a better strategy under a centralized (i.e. deterministic) structure. When the regional security environment is built on rigid group and camp logic, including imminent threats from major powers, and lacks flexibility, hedging is unlikely.

Comparing across borders, other countries with different political systems, including treaty allies and de facto allies of the United States, have also shown similar shifts in hedging policies. The hedging efforts of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia have failed to prevent China from effectively controlling many disputed areas in the South China Sea (SCS), leading these countries to abandon hedging [11]. The Philippines has begun to show goodwill towards Beijing, while Australia, Thailand, and New Zealand have respectively shifted from hedging to balancing China, following China, and shirking responsibility to avoid hedging risks. Although Malaysia can still engage in hedging, it also faces similar challenges as various scenarios predict that "Malaysia will face difficulties in continuing to implement hedging policies" . As Australia becomes a part of the competition between China and the United States, its risk aversion has further weakened. The United States has responded to China's tough stance in the South China Sea and ensured its long-term military presence in the Western and South Pacific by deploying Marine Corps rotation units to Australia and conducting a series of large-scale joint exercises [14]. In November 2020, the Chinese Embassy in Canberra submitted a file containing 14 appeals to Australian media, accusing Canberra of interfering in the South China Sea, and Hong Kong China affairs, and "supporting the United States' anti China movement", which undermined bilateral relations [6].

Based on the comparison between Australia and other countries, it can be found that Australia is more aggressive in supporting China and the United States than other US allies or Pacific Rim countries, to the extent that some people believe that Australia is more eager than allies such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand to adopt a confrontational stance against China at the expense of economic cooperation. On July 1, 2020, Australia released a new Strategic Defense Update Report, which, compared to the 2016 Defense White Paper, more clearly indicates the external geopolitical environment, especially the strategic competition between China and the United States. Subsequently, in September 2021, the AUKUS agreement (Australia, UK, and US) was signed, which granted Australia the right to use cutting-edge US military technology and

allowed Canberra to station and build high-capacity nuclear powered submarines for operations in the Indo Pacific region. Although AUKUS' statement did not mention China, the new security agreement is considered to be explicitly aimed at balancing China's rise in the Asia Pacific region[4]. For example, if Australia only wants self-defense, nuclear powered submarines are considered unnecessary; Conventional diesel electric submarines are more cost-effective in carrying out missions against enemy ships. These facts reflect that the Albanese government supports and has begun implementing the AUKUS agreement - the most important anti China balancing measure of the Morrison government - promising to invest \$368 billion. China believes that Australia's most expensive defense project in history is a "US led effort to contain the rise of Asian superpowers," which is a "wrong and dangerous" move that will "stimulate an arms race" [2].

3. Theoretical Framework

This article aims to comprehensively analyze the diplomatic relations between China and Australia using multiple international relations theoretical frameworks, and thus summarize the factors that affect Australia's policy towards China. To achieve this, it is necessary to first list the theoretical frameworks used and link them to China Australia diplomacy.

3.1 Defensive Realism

The framework of defensive realism was first applied in the analysis of the diplomatic conflict between China and Australia. Kenneth Waltz's international political theory has had a profound impact on international relations research. He believes that anarchic order forces countries to prioritize survival as their primary national goal, and they either use internal balance (i.e. military construction) or external balance (i.e. alliances with other countries) strategies to balance the shift in relative power. Defensive realism is a direct branch of neorealism, which believes that the state is more concerned with security than power, and regards "security seeking" as a decisive act of state behavior. Therefore, defensive realism also regards security dilemmas as an important influence in international relations. Countries often exaggerate potential security threats from other countries, and the development made by one country in strengthening its own security and stability can lead to countermeasures from other countries, thereby intensifying security competition in a vicious cycle.

The conflict between China and Australia in the South China Sea can be included within this framework. While China deploys military force in the South China Sea to maintain its territorial sovereignty and strategic control, Australia actively responds to the United States' "freedom of navigation operation" in the South China Sea by sending warships and reconnaissance planes to the South China Sea. This is similar to the situation in May 2024, where Australia also accused a Chinese Air Force J-10 fighter jet of releasing a flare bomb in front of a Royal Australian Navy Seahawk helicopter over the Yellow Sea, forcing the helicopter pilot to take emergency evasive measures. The behavior of both China and Australia can be explained by the "concerns and countermeasures against potential threats from other countries" under this framework, so this type of conflict will occur again in Australia's exploration of China. Another manifestation of this framework is that Australia has deployed its defense strategy through AUKUS and QUAD. The US UK Australia alliance has signed a nuclear Brown cooperation agreement aimed at enhancing Australia's maritime defense capabilities through advanced nuclear Brown technology. Establish cooperation mechanisms with the United States, Japan, and India (QUAD) to respond to China's expansion in the Indo Pacific region. These indicate that Australia hopes to counter China's rise and consolidate its geopolitical position in the Asia Pacific region through alliances and joint defense strategies.

3.2 Constructivism

Although defensive realism provides an explanatory framework for these diplomatic conflicts, this theory is not sufficient to cover all aspects. For example, the important theme of ideological opposition has not been mentioned. Constructivism provides guidance for analysis in this area, and unlike realism, constructivism emphasizes the distribution of ideas. Constructivism emphasizes two principles: firstly, the structure of human relationships is primarily determined by shared ideas rather than material forces; Secondly, the identity and interests of purposeful actors are constructed by these shared ideas, rather than being inherently inherent. The significance of power distribution in international politics is largely constructed by the distribution of interests, and the content of interests is largely constructed by ideas, resulting in countries, as ideologically influenced actors, not always acting from a completely rational and interest oriented perspective.

The policies of previous Australian governments have shown that both parties strongly support defending democratic principles when dealing with China, which has had a significant impact on bilateral relations. Despite China's protests and often harsh responses, the Australian government still adheres to this policy. From a constructivist perspective, the fundamental differences in political values and identity have become increasingly important sources of geopolitical competition, influencing Australia's views on national interests and threats. Democracy and human rights are the political discourse that shapes Australia's identity. When China's geopolitical competition with Washington intensifies under authoritarianism, Canberra sees it as a significant threat to its own national interests and regional order. Given this sense of national threat, Australia's security interests are seen as those of a free and democratic country, so adhering to liberalism is crucial for curbing China's authoritarianism, essentially preserving the "West" as a refuge for freedom.

The reason for the more intense diplomatic conflicts and military explorations in Australia is also due to China's increasingly tough attitude towards Australia's "ideological taming" towards it. Due to Australia's high dependence on exports to China, the Chinese elite strongly believe that China should be respected and treated equally, and even demand that Australia adjust its foreign policy and ideological stance to adapt to China.

Although ideological opposition is widely recognized as an important contributing factor to the diplomatic conflict between China and Australia, there are still counterexamples in practice. For example, in 1972, Canberra decided to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, when the emerging China was a totalitarian country. Strangely, although the human rights situation has improved in recent years, the relationship between China and the West is deteriorating. On the contrary, Vietnam shares the same authoritarian political system and values with China, but Vietnam has become a friend of Washington and Canberra. China has also adopted a number of proactive and pre-emptive strategies to respond to and prevent Western criticism of China's human rights. However, China's proposal to the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2018 entitled "Promoting the cause of international human rights through win-win cooperation" was opposed only by the United States. Among the remaining members of the Human Rights Council, 28 countries voted in favor and 17 countries abstained. Abstainers include major allies of the United States: Australia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.

3.3 Liberal Institutionalism

In the above analysis, a liberal country exhibits the logic of almost completely non liberal moments. Goodman described the non liberal moment as a time when public opinion replaces science and evidence with a large amount of intentionally erroneous or misplaced information, and linked this to an Australian Strategic Policy Institute report urging a tough stance against China. He

sharply pointed out that although the intention of the report was to protect 'Free Australia' from enemy aggression, in reality it carries greater non liberal risks [8]. In the competition with China, Australian liberals seem to lack confidence in their liberal ideology and have chosen behavior that tends towards self isolation, but the trade dependence between China and Australia still maintains a level of economic exchange.

Internationally, institutional liberals believe that power should serve the values of freedom, but should be exercised with caution and restraint. Institutions play a crucial social role as they are essential for sustained cooperation, which can enhance the interests of the majority, if not everyone (Keohane, 2012). Under this theoretical framework, countries can constrain their behavior to a certain extent by joining international organizations and signing bilateral and multilateral agreements, including mitigating the economic impact of diplomatic conflicts. For China Australia relations, mechanisms such as RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) provide stable multilateral cooperation platforms for the two countries. In terms of policy towards China, the Australian government has put forward the guiding ideology of "cooperating where possible, opposing when necessary, and managing differences properly", which is obviously more moderate compared to the "competition, cooperation, and confrontation" tripartite approach proposed by the United States towards China. Huang Yingxian pointed out that China's pursuit of maximizing its own national interests is legitimate, and Australia should not be shocked or angry about it, but should focus on leveraging its special advantages. Despite the ideological and regional influence competition between Australia and China, trade dependence and institutional liberalism in practice are unlikely to be interrupted as a result. The membership of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which came into effect at the beginning of 2022, indicates that both Canberra and Beijing are still committed to promoting closer regional economic integration rather than expanding economic distance.

4. Induction of influencing factors

Based on the above theoretical frameworks, this article analyzes the diplomatic conflict between China and Australia and the changes in Australia's policy towards China from multiple perspectives.

4.1 Ideological factors under constructivism

Domestic politics, as an important link reinforced under constructivist analysis, is one of the root causes of ideological conflicts. Human rights, democracy, and individual freedom are deeply rooted in the national spirit of Australia, whether in education, media, or social citizenship activities. As a result, Australian voters hope politicians to put forward and defend these principles when dealing with China (although a considerable number of Australian voters are indifferent to Hong Kong China). At least failing to raise these issues may result in political leaders paying a price. According to a survey conducted by the Lowy Institute in 2009, 59% of respondents "somewhat" or "very" believed that China would "take responsible actions in the world". By 2020, this data had decreased to 23% . In the 2018 survey, 82% of respondents believed that China was Australia's economic partner, while only 12% of respondents saw China as a military threat to Australia; By 2020, this proportion has risen to 55% to 41% .

This has led to those who openly criticize and confront China being increasingly seen as "heroes" in Australia's political culture, while those seeking to accommodate China's rise face criticism from the public and media. Criticism of China by Australian politicians is becoming increasingly common, regardless of whether they tend to approach Australia's dependent trading partners with a more conciliatory attitude, as evidenced by the remarks made by Andrew Hastie, a member of the Liberal Party of Western Australia, in 2019 [10].

Not only does it come from domestic pressure, but participation in the liberal international order also puts pressure on domestic political parties in Australia to support ideological taming policies. When Canberra refused to join the sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe on China's human rights violations in Hong Kong China, the Australian government faced strong criticism from domestic and foreign media. The closer cooperation with the United States and other allies to contain China's rise and maintain its own influence will also affect the freedom of Australia's policy towards China. Australia's foreign policy on human rights in China is a collective effort necessary for coalition politics (even Japan and South Korea have adopted a human rights based foreign policy, although their traditional culture usually does not support this approach).

However, it should be noted that ideology is a factor that needs to be comprehensively considered and will be influenced by changes in the environment. For example, despite Indian Prime Minister Modi's violation of the rights of the Muslim minority, Washington and Canberra are still actively cultivating India to establish a strong and friendly relationship. These examples highlight the importance of geopolitics. On the other hand, in February 2023, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation invited several Australian experts for a written discussion on the theme of "What the China Australia War Will Mean", reflecting on the possible consequences of Australia being forced into a military conflict between China and the United States, which sparked widespread thinking [15].

4.2 Security dilemma under defensive realism

While the need to maintain the US Australia alliance forces Australia to pay costs, the fear of being "abandoned" has long dominated Australia's security policy, and doubts about the US's ability and willingness to defend the interests of its Asia Pacific allies are deepening. The Australian Defense Strategy Assessment points out that the United States, as a key ally of Australia, is no longer a unipolar leader in the Indo Pacific region. The risk of regional arms races and military conflicts has intensified, causing significant changes to Australia's existing security environment [9], thereby arousing Australia's perception of the threat posed by China's rise. Meanwhile, as a long-term ally of the Commonwealth and the United States, Australia is highly aligned ideologically with the UK and the US. Since 2016, "rule-based order" has gradually become a core concept in Australia's foreign policy. As a medium-sized country, it is naturally at a disadvantage when interacting with major powers, and therefore needs to work together with other medium-sized countries to uphold international rules and shape the international behavior of major powers. However, it should be pointed out that the establishment of any international rules and order is a reflection of the distribution of international power at that time. Australia's understanding of the international order has significant Western centric characteristics and regards the presence of the United States and Western democratic values as necessary components of this order.

It can be said that the root of Australia's perceived threat to China at the value level is its identity anxiety caused by uncertainty about domestic democratic values and international norms. This anxiety undoubtedly arises with the rise of US trade protectionism and the enormous impact that the Trump administration will have on the ideological foundation of the US Australia alliance. Representing Australia's anxiety in the face of great uncertainty, as well as its dependence on two superpowers in both economic and diplomatic aspects, prompting it to change its policies. At the same time, based on the above analysis, Australia's interpretation of maintaining its security and interests as a medium-sized country among superpowers is a "rule of order" centered on the United States. So, in events such as the South China Sea issue, Australia will be extremely sensitive to consider China as a disruptor of existing rules. As a result, Australia continues to view the US military presence in the Asia Pacific region as a key element in maintaining regional power balance,

seeking to strengthen the Asia Pacific alliance system centered around the US Australia alliance (although with the premise of abandoning economic interests), enhance deterrence capabilities, and maintain regional stability. The spillover of competition between China and the United States has led Australia to change its consistent policy and adopt a strategy of strengthening alliances with countries such as the United States and Australia, attempting to "balance" China's rise through this.

4.3 Trade Transactions under Liberal Institutionalism

Although the confrontation between the two countries has further escalated, the trade exchanges between the two sides have not been greatly affected as expected. The survey data by Golley et al. shows that the overall impact of changes in the broader political atmosphere between Canberra and Beijing on Australia China trade is limited. Although Beijing has suspended market access for various commodity exports, the total trade volume between Australia and China continues to grow. In 2020, the year of the suspension measures, the total trade volume remained stable. Despite the economic impact of the global pandemic, the total trade volume increased by 14% in 2021 and another 6% in 2022. On the other hand, geopolitical allies' support for Australia is almost entirely limited to words. The sales lost by Australian exporters in the Chinese market have been taken away by geopolitical allies and enemies. China's imports of affected goods from Australia have decreased by \$14 billion, while imports from the United States have increased by \$6.8 billion. In addition, Canada and New Zealand have also been among the top five beneficiaries. In fact, the only country that has suffered the most sales losses in reclaiming Australia from China is the United States, which indicates a fact: many allied countries are competitors in the trade field.

Prominent figures from some geopolitical friendly countries boast that Australian brewers will receive support for increased purchases driven by "shared values," thereby advocating against the practice of abandoning open trade in opposition to liberal institutionalism. However, national assessments will show that the cost of Beijing's trade disruption is not shared by geopolitical allies, but is borne solely by Australian producers. Furthermore, in order to bring benefits to domestic political constituencies, some geopolitical allies have taken policy actions that make it more difficult for Australia to resist Beijing's interference. One example is that in January 2020, Washington and Beijing reached a bilateral trade agreement that prioritized the commercial interests of American companies in the Chinese market, even if it evaded global trade rules and regulations, endangering the interests of security allies and geopolitical friends.

Although the concept of 'trustworthy trade' may have surface appeal, careful examination reveals that its practical applicability is very limited. Firstly, it aligns with the fundamental principles of risk management. As pointed out by the Productivity Commission, the starting point for effective risk management is that "risks are best managed by those who have a direct motivation to mitigate them, which typically means the company" [3]. Enterprises can use a range of mitigation mechanisms to reduce the need for pre cutting specific market risks. At the same time, companies recognize that geopolitical tensions can fluctuate over time, and even if short-term or medium-term risks increase, they may remain connected to profitable markets [7]. For most affected industries, entering the fiercely competitive global market enables companies to quickly and cost effectively shift sales from China to other markets such as coal and cotton. For other industries, 'grey channels' provide a means to circumvent restrictions (such as crayfish). Enterprises in other industries can still adjust their output mix to produce goods that are not covered by destructive measures [5]. When one of Australia's largest wine producers, Treasury Wine Estates (TWE), faced an anti-dumping tariff of 175.6%, its CEO responded, 'We are still committed to China, we just need to come up with another way to achieve it' [13]. Even if there are principled reasons for government intervention, any reason for intervention needs to prove that its benefits outweigh its costs, and

Australia's geopolitical friends have not shared these costs due to political factors.

Related to liberal institutionalism is also multilateral trade with other countries. It can be said that Australia not only maintains trade relations with China through the efforts of its businesses, but also further engages in multilateral trade to alleviate economic threats. However, the existing confrontational situation has led to the emergence of the concept of "trustworthy trade". How can policymakers decide whether and to what extent a trading partner can be "trusted" and prioritize it in policy-making? If trade partners are selected based on ideology, most countries in East and South Asia (which account for 70% of Australia's total trade) need to be excluded as either "flawed democracies," "mixed regimes," or "authoritarian regimes. Alternatively, the title of "trustworthy" comes from a record of avoiding economic coercion and complying with international trade rules. In this case, the United States is not eligible. A 2019 report by the New American Security Center in Washington first pointed out that "coercive economic measures have been a long-standing tool of US foreign policy, dating back to the early 19th century. However, since the end of the Cold War, coercive economic measures have become an increasingly important tool in US foreign policy" [1].

So, in summary, Australia's flexible market helps to limit the costs caused by Beijing's disruption of trade, but the key external source of elasticity is the open multilateral trading system. Recognizing that Australia is protected by international rules and markets means that strengthening these multilateral rules and deepening collective interdependence with Southeast and Northeast Asian partners is beneficial, regardless of whether these partners are labeled as 'trusted' or not. In April 2023, Trade Minister Don Farrell made it clear that Canberra's concept of trade diversification is not aimed at diminishing China's importance. On the contrary, this means 'returning to China while also opening up to India, the UK, and the EU '. The membership of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) indicates that the two countries will not give up their economic vitality due to political demands, especially with the active response of international organizations and norms, as well as enterprises. Trade as a variable will in turn stabilize the relationship between the two governments.

5. Recommendations and Prospects

In summary, the evolution of China Australia relations is influenced by multiple factors, including economic interests, political stance, foreign policy, and changes in the international environment. Defensive realism explains how Australia chose to rely on the United States due to security concerns and adopted a confrontational strategy in defense policy; Constructivism emphasizes how ideological opposition between two countries shapes diplomatic relations; Liberalism reveals that despite political and security contradictions, the two countries still have a strong foundation for economic cooperation; And the liberal institutionalism within it indicates that through international mechanisms and rules, China and Australia can ease conflicts and maintain trade relations within a multilateral framework. In the future, the relationship between China and Australia may continue to adjust through friction and cooperation. Australia needs to seek a more balanced stance on its policy towards China, while China may also make flexible adjustments to its policy towards Australia based on global strategic interests. Overall, although China Australia relations will still face uncertainty in the short term, economic cooperation remains a key factor driving the development of bilateral relations in the era of globalization.

From the perspective of Chinese decision-makers, this article suggests that when dealing with China Australia relations, China should adopt a more comprehensive and flexible strategy, combining ideological, economic, cultural exchanges, and security cooperation at multiple levels to promote the stable development of bilateral relations while safeguarding national interests and international image.

In the field of ideology and democracy and human rights, China should ease the confrontation and establish a dialogue mechanism. Through the UN Human Rights Council APEC, The East Asia Summit and other international platforms engage in constructive dialogue with Australia to enhance mutual understanding and reduce Australian society's bias against China's anti liberal democratic stance. Adopting a proactive and preemptive strategy has had a significant effect in responding to Western criticism of human rights in China. At present, mainstream media in Australia often interpret China's political system based on Western values of freedom and democracy, which can easily lead to misunderstandings. By participating in multilateral dialogues such as China Australia press conferences and media forums, both sides can communicate on sensitive issues and avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations. And the use of social platforms (such as Xiaohongshu) also helps to break stereotypes about Chinese society.

In terms of economic and trade, China can promote cooperation under the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) framework, encourage direct dialogue between enterprises of the two countries, enhance supply chain stability, and deepen mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation. It is worth noting that the proportion of educational exchanges between the two countries is also very significant. We can restore and expand cultural exchanges through the establishment of cultural exchange programs, promote mutual visits between international students and scholars, strengthen cooperation between universities and think tanks of the two countries, and further achieve bilateral dialogue. For example, the collaborative graduate program between Monash University and Shanghai Jiao Tong University is an example of academic exchange.

In terms of military security, it is recommended that the two countries establish a high-level dialogue mechanism on defense affairs between China and Australia to ensure that military contacts between the two sides in the South China Sea and other regions are controllable and avoid misjudgment and escalation. Both sides can promote a military hotline between the Chinese and Australian navies and air forces to ensure quick communication in case of emergencies and avoid the situation getting out of control.

The Australian government should adopt a more balanced strategy in its policy towards China, avoiding being swayed by geopolitical competition while safeguarding its own economic interests and national security. Firstly, decision-makers should avoid the tendency to take unilateral sides and maintain flexible diplomacy in the competition between the United States and China. They should neither completely lean towards the US's "Indo Pacific strategy" nor give up bilateral cooperation with China to safeguard their own national interests. Secondly, trade normalization should also be promoted to reduce unnecessary confrontation and the negative impact of political factors on economic cooperation, especially in maintaining long-term cooperative relationships in key industries such as minerals, agricultural products, and energy.

In the future, China Australia relations will constantly adjust between competition and cooperation. China should enhance its influence on Australian society and government through various channels such as economic, trade, cultural, and military dialogues, while maintaining a firm stance on key interests. Australia needs to maintain its independence in the face of competition between the United States and China, and handle its relations with China with a more pragmatic attitude. With the joint efforts of both sides, the relationship between the two countries may still develop towards a more stable and predictable direction.

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