

The Rescue of Aristotle's Substance Theory to "Phenomena" from the Perspective of Chen Kang's Substance "Übertragenderweise" Theory

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Abstract: This paper starts from Plato's "Allegory of the Cave", and firstly clarified that Plato's Idealistic spirit obscures the "phenomenon"; And then it introduced the theory of transition (Übertragenderweise) of substance by Chen Kang, a research scholar of the occult school of Aristotle's philosophy, and clarified the "transition" in Aristotle's Substance (ousia) theory in different categories; It then proceeds to explain, within the framework of the transitional theory of substance, the salvation that Aristotle's theory of substance accomplishes for the "phenomenon" in separate articles., and summed up the connotation of the natural philosophical spirit embedded in the theory of substance of Aristotle; And in the concluding part, it is affirmed that the spirit of Aristotle's natural philosophy has played an important spiritual leading role in the vigorous development of natural science in later times.

1. Introduction

Plato's "Allegory of the Cave" uses "the sun" as a metaphor for the ultimate reality of the world of Idea, and the "soul's turn" to face the sun directly is the spiritual keynote of his idealism. However, facing the sun directly makes the dazzling light obscure the phenomenal world, and thus, as Kant said, Plato left the phenomenal world and flew to the other side of the vacuum of the Idea. But when we look at Aristotle's theory of Substance from the perspective of Chen Kang's Substance Übertragenderweise theory, We find that in the "Metaphysics" he "saves the phenomenon" by bringing Plato's pure a priori philosophy, which obscures the phenomenal world, back into contact with vibrant nature through the double "Übertragenderweise" of Materie and "eidos" to the composite Substance. From then on, the two worlds returned to a position of equal importance, and a spirit of natural philosophy that unifies the a priori and the empirical was birthed from it.

2. "The phenomenal world" is obscured by the dazzling light of "The world of Idea"

In the famous "Allegory of the Cave", Plato uses the progressive relationship between the shadow of the idol on the wall of the cave, the idol outside the cave and the fire that illuminates the idol, the real things in the world and the sun that illuminates the things in the world in terms of reality, ontology, and grounding to draw an analogy between the phenomenal world and the world

of Idea. Plato uses the analogy of the prisoner in the cave to those who are absorbed in the phenomenal world, who think that the shadow is the most real thing, not realising that outside the cave there are fire and idols, real things and the sun, which are more real and more ontological than the shadow and are the basis of the shadow. Shadows, idols and fire correspond to the phenomenal world of illusion (fluid and subjective). The real things and the sun in the story are metaphors for the Ideas of the world of Idea and the supreme Idea of the Goodness, which is the basis of all Ideas (self-causes). ^[1] Based on "Allegory of the Cave" Plato also calls the world of Idea the "world of archetypes" and the phenomenal world the "world of shadows". However, it is easy to draw an obvious inference from "Allegory of the Cave ": "When the shadow of a thing is lit nowhere by the light of the fire from all sides, the thing itself still exists independently of the shadow; and, conversely, when the real thing does not exist, the shadow cannot exist alone". Based on such reasoning, it is easy to understand the kind of ontological priority that Plato's world of Idea (archetypes) has over the world of phenomena (shadows) simply from "Allegory of the Cave ".

And when we begin to focus too much on such an inter-dimensional dependence of the phenomenal world on the world of Idea, Plato then tells us that the world of Idea is eternal and unborn, corresponding to "Allegory of the Cave ", the sun is unborn with the real thing. Based on the a priori setting of the Ideas as unborn and imperishable, it is natural that we cannot achieve a simultaneous grasp of the causal laws of the phenomenal world by recognising the causal laws of the world of Idea, which requires that we must descend into the phenomenal world to recognise the causal laws. Yet the phenomenal world is obscured by this dazzling light when we look too much directly at the sun (The world of Idea) following the teachings of the divine Plato. In non-metaphorical terms, whenever we encounter the complexity of the phenomenal world and the uncertainty of the various phenomena that are difficult to attribute at the moment, it is easy to give up the difficult path of discovery and to be content with converting the question of the law of causality within the phenomenal world into a trick of causality between the two worlds, and thus the importance of the Law of Sufficient Reason, which is the cornerstone of the development of science, is overshadowed.

In the late "Barmenides", Plato launches a self-criticism of the young Socrates (representing his own early-medium conception) through the mouth of Barmenides, pointing out the contradictions and incompleteness of his own early-medium conception and trying to achieve self-concordance and unity of the contradictions in his early-medium conception by means of dialectic. Gregory Vlastos argues that in the "Barmenides", Plato realised the inadequacy of the earlier Idealism, but he did not find the core problem, and therefore Plato did not change his theory in the later period.^[2]

We think that Plato's late theory of Idea did have a full discernment from the aspect of brokenness, especially in the "Barmenides", he specially emphasised that the master of Idea is only related to the slave of Idea, and the master of reality is only related to the slave of reality, which suggests that there has begun to be a tendency towards the de-obscuring of the causal laws presented to us by the phenomenal world. But fundamentally his philosophical tone is still devoted to the legitimacy and completeness of the purely a priori world of Idea. The task of "saving the phenomena" at the philosophical level was actually accomplished by Aristotle's Substance Theory, which synthesised the spirit of Plato's Idealism and the spirit of nature at the same time.

3. An Overview of Chen Kang's Ubertragenderweise Theory of Substance

There is this apparent contradiction between each of the two works dealing with Aristotle's theory of Substance, the "Categories" and the "Metaphysics": in the "Categories", Aristotle considers individual things to be the first Substance and the species of individual things (eidos) to be the second Substance. Whereas in Book VII of the "Metaphysics", Aristotle considers "eidos" to

be the first Substance. Regarding the two Ideas that belong to Aristotle's philosophical system but are contradictory, Chen Kang scholars, starting from the research method of occultation, believe that they are produced before and after (the idea of the Book of "Categories" comes first, and the idea of the "Metaphysics" comes later), and that they are two phenomena in the philosophical reflections of Aristotle in the past decades, and the same as what is historically geschichtliche Gegebenheiten.

In the "Categories", Aristotle's definition of Substance begins with two principles of categorisation of the All: a. predicated of a subject or not predicated of a subject; b. dependent on (Inhärenz) a subject or not dependent on a subject. The first principle is divided according to the logic of words (logische Prädikation); and the second principle, Aristotle made this additional explanation: dependent on a subject that is to leave a subject it can not exist, such as so-and-so grammar, so-and-so white. The second principle Chen Kang called the principle of metaphysical division. In the "Categories" Aristotle's division between substance and non-substance is governed exclusively by metaphysical principles: only that which is not dependent on a subject is a substance. This is also the first characteristic contained in the concept of substance of the Book of "Categories": the final substratum nature; And belonging to the same Substance, then apply the principle of reasoning for Substance hierarchy, that is, the Substance that does not serve as the predicate of a subject is the basic Substance or the first Substance, otherwise it is the secondary Substance. From the above, Chen Kang clearly concludes that Aristotle's division of the first and second Substance in the "Categories" is based solely on the logic of words. This is also the second main characteristic of the concept of Substance in the "Categories": final subjectivity. The other two properties of Substance that Aristotle proposes in the "Categories" are "Thisness" and "Khoorismos". One of the characteristics of "Thisness", which in the original means "this one here", according to Aristotle, is indivisibility, the absolute one and no longer the many; and "Khoorismos" means that it exists in itself apart from contingent nature.

In the "Metaphysics", Aristotle's discussion of the concept of Substance clearly relates to the concept of Substance held by others of his time. In Book V, Chapter VIII of the "Metaphysics" Aristotle lists four "Categories" of things he knew that were universally considered Substance. 1) The elements, all objects, living beings, celestial bodies, and their parts. For they are the final subject. 2) The inmanenter Seinsgrund of an object. 3) Boundaries of objects, numbers, etc. 4) The nature, i.e., the essence of an individual object (Einzelsubstanz), which defines the object. After comprehensive reference to others' concepts of Substance and then in-depth analysis of Substance theory, it is obvious that Aristotle's view of Substance formed in the "Metaphysics" constitutes an obvious contradiction with that in the "Categories". Chen Kang summarises four points in this regard: 1) The metaphysical principle in the "Categories" is not adopted here in the "Metaphysics"; 2) In the "Categories", "Thisness" is only owned by the first Substance, whereas in the "Metaphysics" Aristotle considers it to be the nature of "eidos". 3) In the "Categories", the second Substance contains not only species (eidos) but also genera, but in the "Metaphysics", genera do not appear in the four "Categories" of Substance. 4) "Khoorismos" belongs to individual Substance such as individual human beings in the "Categories", but in the "Metaphysics", Aristotle categorised it as *eidos*.

Chen Kang believes that this contradiction is not diametrically separated from the opposites, on the basis of which he continues to analyse the Aristotelian system of Substance theory from the point of view of occurrences, and tries to grasp the internal logic of this transitional shift in his theory of Substance: first of all, an important point is that in the "Metaphysics" Aristotle newly put forward the concept of "Materie", "eidos" (in the piece translated as Form) and Materie, composite Substance (individual objects) are all categorised as Substance. At the same time, in the framework of the triple Substance of "eidos", Materie, and composite Substance, the final subjectivity is no

longer the most important characteristic of the Substance as it was in the "Categories". Aristotle at this point thinks that Thisness and Khorismos are the most adequate properties of Substance. He combines these two properties as properties of "eidos" and uses them as a criterion for measuring Substance, leading to the conclusion that "eidos" and composite Substance are somewhat more substantive than Materie. And continuing to measure both according to this criterion, "eidos" is again more substantive than composite Substance. The properties of individual objects emphasised in the "Categories" as the first Substance are the properties possessed by the composite Substance of the "Metaphysics"; and it is in fact the "Metaphysics" that continues to delve into the origin of the properties of the composite Substance (individual objects). Chen Kang calls the process by which the composite Substance acquires its properties a transition (Übertragenderweise). The final subjectivity is transitioned from one of the two constituent elements of the individual object -- Materie. "Khorismos" and "Thisness" are also transitioned from one of the two constituent elements of the individual object-- "eidos".

What follows is Chen Kang's explanation of this transition: a. Transition of the final subjectivity: in the process of generating an individual object, the ungeformte Materie is the substrate; in the process of changing the quantity, nature, and location of an individual object while maintaining itself, the geformte Materie is the substrate.. Thus the final subjectivity, the final substratum, belongs originally to the Materie, and it transitions into the properties of individual object when the Materie is formed into the individual object. b. Transition of the "Khorismos" of "eidos": Chen Kang especially emphasises that the "Khorismos" of "eidos" in Chapter 8 of "Metaphysics" does not mean that the "eidos" exist apart from the individual object, but rather, they are separated from the other categories such as quantity, nature, etc, as contingent attributes. In the "Metaphysics", Aristotle speaks of Substance being included in the definitions of other categories such as quantity and nature in the "Metaphysics", but the definition of Substance does not include anything from any other category. Definitions take the nature of things (Wesen) as their object, and "eidos" is the nature of things. When we give a general definition of an individual object, i.e. describing the content of its "eidos" rather than its quantity, nature, etc of Akzidenz(quantity, nature, etc are here not necessarily excluded by Aristotle from the definition/nature of the thing), in this sense the "eidos" exists apart from all other "Categories". Thus, when the Materie is formed into a composite Substance, the individual object inherits the "Khorismos" implied between the "eidos" and the other "Categories". This is the transition from the "Khorismos" of the predicate form to the "Khorismos" of the individual object. c. Transition of "Thisness": In the twelve books of the "Metaphysics" Aristotle argues that the Materie does not have "Thisness" when it merely touches the "eidos" without forming individual objects, but only when it has formed the individual object, "Thisness" realised in the Materie. In this process the Materie plays the role of the Material Cause of the individual object, an inert cause; whereas the form is the nativity, the formal, purposive cause of the individual object; and the original text describes "Thisness" as the formal cause of the initiative in the following way: "It is because of it (eidos) that an object is called this one here". It is thus said that it is the "Thisness" of "eidos" which transitions into the "Thisness" of the individual object due to the Formung de Materie.^[3]

4. Analysing Aristotle's rescue of "phenomena" from Chen Kang's perspective of Substance theory

From the framework of Chen Kang's transition theory of Substance, we can clearly see that through the double transition of Materie and "eidos", the theory of Substance in "Metaphysics" makes the two worlds return to the position of reciprocal importance and realises the "salvation of phenomena", thus revealing a spirit of natural philosophy that unifies the a priori and the empirical.

4.1. Rescue of Phenomena from Sceptical Tendencies

From the "Categories" to the "Metaphysics", the most important characteristic of the Substance changes from the final subjectivity to the "thisness" and the "Khorismos", and it is categorised as the characteristic of the "eidos". The discourse-logical "Khorismos" of Substance as "Categories" from other "Categories" is transformed into a "Khorismos" of "eidos" as natures from other "accidents"(Akzidenz). Thus the Substance in Aristotle no longer remains a discursive concept, but as an a priori object of cognition that a strict boundary is drawn with the product of cognition(Aristotle, who advocates Wax Theory, puts more emphasis on the object of cognition, and the capacity of cognition is still passive, and determinate in him),and thus truly and powerfully secures for the phenomenon an ontological grounding, avoiding the sceptical path which refusing to unite phenomena and knowledge to the higher ontological level and ultimately leading to the scepticism towards the empirical phenomena.

4.2. The Rescue of the Inner Causality of Phenomena

From the "Categories" to the "Metaphysics", the First Substance is raised from the level of sensory objects to the level of higher objects of knowledge, which is consistent with Platonic cognition. However, Plato's assertion of the idea of eternity and absolute uniqueness as the basis of the phenomenal world, and the idea of the "Goodness" as the ultimate basis, inadvertently obscures the exploration of the richness of the causal law of the phenomenal world, which is endowed with the nature of birth and death. Seeing the limitations of Aristotle's elevation of the phenomenal world by claiming that individual things are the first Substance in the "Categories", and seeing the tendency of his teacher Plato's Idealism to emphasise the grounding of the phenomenal world by the world of Ideas, thus obscuring the exploration of the causality of the phenomenal world, Aristotle finally proposes that in the hierarchy of higher objects of cognition, only the individual (eidos) is the first Substance, which reflects to some extent his tendency to synthesise both the empirical and a priori worlds, which he was unwilling to abandon in favour of a synthesis. His theory of Substance neither rejects the a priori altogether, but argues back from Plato for a discourse on the search for causality within the phenomenal world

4.3. The salvation of the Efficient Cause of phenomena

On the theological level God, as the original Efficient Cause (bewegende Ursache) of all things, is in Plato's Ideological framework an immovable, eternal, universal eidōs separate from nature. And in Aristotle's "Metaphysics" of the Substance, his stark assertion that only the individual can cause actual motion lays the metaphysical groundwork for classical physics, which studies Efficient Cause. And it is under the influence of Aristotle's mature natural philosophical spirit, which combines the spirit of nature and the spirit of Idealism, that the flagrant rational-theological tendency of later times was formed.

5. Conclusions

To sum up, we can see from Chen Kang's theory of the transition of Substance that the Substance in the "Categories" of Aristotle is still empirical, but in the "Metaphysics" the Substance has become a priori and tries to synthesise it with the empirical. This synthesis brings Plato's purely a priori philosophy, which obscures the phenomenal world, back together with vibrant nature. Through Aristotle's synthesis, knowledge of the phenomenal world is no longer seen in the pre-Socratic period as a completely individualised and instantaneous knowledge (nothing resides,

the individual leads to the individual), but is elevated to a knowledge that is a priori universal at the ontological level, and achieves the philosophical salvation of the phenomenal. As a result, a clear rational-theological tone was laid down in the West, and the metaphysical foundation was laid for the modern natural sciences, which combine experimental science and mathematical methods. From Newton's "Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy" to Einstein's "Theory of Relativity" and other theoretical physics systems are all permeated with the spiritual connotation of Aristotle's theory of Substance. At the end of the article, a classic analogy from Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" is borrowed to emphasise the importance of the spirit of natural philosophy, in which the a priori and empirical are inseparable: "The light dove, which separates the air and feels the resistance of the air when it is flying freely, may imagine that it will fly even more lightly in a space without air. In the same way, Plato abandoned the world of the senses because it set such strict limits on knowing, and, puffing up the wings of the Ideas, ventured to the other side of the world of the senses, into the vacuum of pure knowing. He did not find that he made no progress in his endeavours, because he had no support on which to base himself, so that he could brace himself and be able to exert himself on it, and thus set the knowing in motion".^[4]

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